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Industrial Injuries Compensation: Tort and Social 
Security Compared  
RICHARD LEWIS* 
 
ABSTRACT 
This article highlights aspects of the tort system of compensation for personal injury 
by comparing the provision made for workers under the state’s industrial injury 
scheme. The relative significance of the two schemes has rarely been considered and 
has not been dealt with in any law journal. Although lawyers are ever-present in tort 
claims, they have little involvement with applications for social security benefit. 
Partly as a result, there is a stark contrast between the voluminous literature on the 
common law, on the one hand, and the very limited information about statute-based 
workers’ compensation on the other. This article tries to redress the balance by 
bringing the industrial scheme back into the spotlight. Comparisons are made of 
entitlement under both systems and the value of the compensation they provide. The 
industrial scheme is shown to pay benefits which, in the long term, can often exceed 
the lump sum paid in tort. A wide range of statistics is used to illustrate the relative 
importance and practical effect of the two regimes. The enduring significance of the 
industrial scheme is revealed together with other findings which may surprise those 
familiar only with litigation at common law. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Tort scholars have rarely related the common law system of compensation to other 
schemes of public or private insurance which make provision for those suffering 
personal injury. In particular, comparisons of tort with the benefits provided by the 
welfare state are hard to find. Academics seem to not to be interested in the inter-
relation of the tort system with other forms of compensation even where there is a 
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direct effect upon the damages that are paid.1 However, Patrick Atiyah’s Accidents, 
Compensation and the Law which first appeared in 1970 still stands as the 
outstanding exception to this closed-world analysis of tort. As part of a much wider 
perspective Atiyah compared tort with workmen’s compensation. This became 
especially relevant following the report of the Pearson Commission which 
recommended that a no-fault road accident scheme be created based on that which 
had been established for industrial injuries.2 Some members of that body even hoped 
that deducting these and other benefits from common law claims would eventually 
mean that tort would ‘wither away.’3 A few years later Atiyah was still able to write4: 
‘It is hard to believe that anyone could make a dispassionate review of the tort 
system and the industrial injury system without coming to the firm conclusion 
that on almost every count the latter is the superior and more up to date model 
of a compensation system.’ 
Much has happened since. Instead of withering away, tort actions have flourished: 
there are four times as many claims brought today than there were forty years ago 
when the Commission reported. By contrast, the industrial injuries scheme has been 
cut and cut again in efforts to reduce welfare expenditure and rationalise benefits. 
This might lead one to suppose that the industrial scheme has become increasingly 
irrelevant to policy makers. However, it is argued here that a comparative analysis 
such as that undertaken by Atiyah is still of considerable value to students of the law 
of tort: it can help reveal the distinctive features of the common law action so that we 
can better assess the value of such litigation against the provision made more 
generally for those who suffer injury. This article also breaks new ground in using a 
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1
 Although there is a small literature dealing with ‘collateral benefits,’ almost nothing has been written, 
for example, on the important practical rules and wider context concerning the deduction of social 
security benefits and health care costs from the damages award. R. Lewis, Deducting Benefits from 
Damages for Personal Injury (London: OUP, 1999) chap 1. 
2
 Report of the Royal Commission on Civil Liability and Compensation for Personal Injury (1978, 
Cmnd 7054), chairman Lord Pearson vol 1 para 1004. 
3
 Ibid. For example, Professor Stevenson at vol 1 para 448. 
4
 P.S. Atiyah, Accidents, Compensation and the Law (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 3rd ed 1980) 
407. 
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range of statistics to bring the respective schemes up to date and thus provide a firmer 
base for describing how they operate in practice. 
We begin with a summary of the history of compensation for injured workers. 
Then the present day significance of both schemes is assessed by considering the 
number of claims processed and the total compensation paid out. Next we compare 
various aspects of entitlement under each scheme and consider how the compensation 
is assessed and delivered. The final section looks at how claims are processed and 
administered and the relative cost of the two systems. Throughout the article more 
detail is given about the industrial scheme than tort because most readers are likely to 
be more familiar with the common law system. 
2. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT 
Although the origins of tort liability lie in pre-medieval times, the first reported 
case of an employee suing his employer for personal injury was not until 1837.5 The 
claim failed, and relatively few such actions were brought in that century and much of 
the next. There were many reasons why workers did not sue. It is true that the legal 
rules were very much against them: proving that another was at fault for their injury 
was fraught with uncertainty and, if any wrongdoing was established, workers faced 
several draconian defences which enabled employers to avoid liability entirely.6 If a 
worker was found to have contributed in any way to his accident his claim was barred. 
The same result followed when judges all too readily found that a worker had 
impliedly consented to running the risk of injury. Men were seen as free agents, 
knowledgeable about the risks encountered and either able to avoid them or walk 
                                                 
5Priestley v Fowler (1837) 3 M & W 1. A.W.B. Simpson, Leading Cases in the Common Law (Oxford: 
OUP, 1995) 128 and R.W. Kostal, Law and English Railway Capitalism 1825-1875 (Oxford: OUP, 
1994) 259 - 267. However, employees did sue for unpaid wages and other injustices. M.A. Stein, 
‘Priestley v Fowler and the Emerging Tort of Negligence’ (2003) 44 Boston College Law Review 689 
at 725. The relationship of employer and employee did not exist in the same form in earlier times when 
masters had implied obligations to care for their injured servants as discussed in S. Deakin and F. 
Wilkinson, The Law of the Labour Market (Oxford: OUP, 2005) chaps 2 and 3.  
6
 R.A. Epstein, ‘The Historical Origins and Economic Structure of Workers’ Compensation Law’ 
(1982) 16 Georgia Law Review 775. K. Oliphant, ‘Tort Law, Risk, and Technical Innovation in 
England’ (2014) 59 McGill LJ 819 at 834. M. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law 1780-
1860 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977) 99. 
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away from the job.7 The ease with which they were blamed, or even blamed 
themselves, for injuries that occurred was all too evident.  Judges were inclined to 
accept that most accidents were caused by the negligence of workmen alone and it 
was they, rather than employers, who needed a deterrent to improve the safety of the 
workplace.8 As a result they ‘quashed nearly every innovative attempt to create law 
favourable to workers,’9 and at best only weak and confused rights emerged.10 
A more important obstacle than these legal rules which limited claims was the 
‘living law.’11 That is, the real difficulties for employees lay not so much in the tort 
textbooks yet to be written but in the realities of workplace power and relations, and 
in people’s attitudes towards misfortune. The suggestion that an injured worker might 
have considered suing his master is very hard to contemplate. For example, in 
Merthyr, that crucible of the industrial revolution, no iron worker or miner for a 
second would have thought that he could have brought a claim against the likes of the 
Crawshay family or any of the other ironmasters. Lawsuits were simply not a 
plausible option.12 
There were many reasons for the absence of claims. A root cause was that many 
workers were not aware that a wrong had been done to them. An accident was an 
everyday occurrence and part of their way of life, and the risk of injury was seen as in 
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 J. L. Bronstein, Caught in Machinery: Workplace Accidents and Injured Workers in Nineteenth 
Century Britain (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008) 23 and chap 4. 
8
 M. Lobban ‘Tort’ in W. Cornish et al, The Oxford History of the Laws of England: Vol X11: 1820-
1914 (Oxford: OUP, 2010) 1009. 
9
 M.A. Stein, ‘Victorian Tort Liability for Workplace Injuries’ [2008] University of Illinois L Rev 933 
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 S. Hedley, ‘Tort and Personal Injuries, 1850 to the Present’ in T.T. Arvind and J. Steele, Tort Law 
and the Legislature (Oxford: Hart, 2013) 237. 
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 L. Friedman, ‘Civil Wrongs: Personal Injury Law in the late Nineteenth Century’ [1987] American 
Bar Foundation Research J 351. For the early history in the U.K. see P.W.J. Bartrip and S.B. Burman, 
The Wounded Soldiers of Industry: Industrial Compensation Policy 1833 - 1897 (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1983). 
12
 Kostal above n 5 at 279 and G.A. Williams, The Merthyr Rising (Croom Helm, 1978). 
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the hands of Fate rather than the employer.13 There was a culture of stoicism and 
fatalism.14 If workers were aware that a wrong had been done, they were ignorant of 
how to take matters further. Often illiterate, they lacked the support of their fellow 
workers for there were only limited labour organisations to help them. It is true that 
for some workers there were guilds and nascent trade unions and there were friendly 
societies which could provide support at least in the short-term.15 However, these 
organisations did not begin to fund legal claims until many years later. Had anyone 
thought of seeking redress they would have had to act alone: finding a lawyer able 
and willing to act would have been almost impossible, especially in the new centres of 
industry. Workers would not therefore know, for example, that as plaintiffs they could 
not testify on their own behalf.16 In contrast, they would have been all too aware of 
the difficulties of getting others to speak out publicly against their employer and the 
ease with which their account could be contradicted.17  
If an action were brought, there was the prospect of incurring costs which almost 
no worker could bear.18 A more significant deterrent in practice was the likelihood 
that a tort claim would lead to the loss of work-related benefits such as employer’s 
sick pay, or continued employment in an easier job, or medical treatment from work 
                                                 
13 Friedman above n 11 at 376. See further K.S. Abraham and G.E. White, ‘The Transformation of the 
Civil Trial and the Emergence of American Tort Law’ 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2827667 at  10, forthcoming Arizona LR. ‘Prior to 
the emergence of altered understandings of the sources of causal agency in the universe that 
accompanied the advent of modernity in England and America, fortuitous injuries to humans were 
thought of as “caused” by agents, such as God, fate, nature, the cycles of history, and a social order 
with relatively fixed ranks, that were independent of human will and determined the destinies of 
individuals and societies. Being injured, like falling sick, was treated by this view of causal agency as 
the equivalent of “fate” or “God’s will” or as a punishment for failing to conform to the conduct 
expectations associated with one’s rank in the social order.’ 
14
 Bronstein above n 7 at 96. 
15
 E.A. Cawthorn, Job Accidents and the Law in England’s Early Railway Age (New York: Edwin 
Mellen Press, 1997) chap 5. 
16
 Abraham and White above n 13. 
17
 J.F. Witt, The Accidental Republic (Harvard:  Harvard University Press, 2004) 56. 
18
 Very limited aid was available as noted by Bartrip and Burman above n 11 at 25 – 28. 
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doctors.19 The wives or children of injured workers might be more readily given a job 
by the employer to make up for the loss in family income.20 Suing an employer ‘often 
meant antagonising the most powerful men in the region and jeopardizing not only 
one’s employment prospects, but also one’s housing, church membership and even 
access to town poor relief.’21 Nor could workers endure the lengthy, complicated and 
uncertain litigation process itself. Defence tactics included adopting morally 
questionable strategies22 such as approaching still dazed victims to sign settlement 
agreements for paltry sums.23 Ultimately any claims were opposed by the better 
lawyers who were able to specialise in civil litigation as a result of the repeated work 
and higher rewards that were on offer from defendants and their insurers. 
The final difficulty faced by workers was that they often needed what tort could 
not supply: urgent recompense to replace their wage loss. As a result, they were all 
too ready to accept any money that was on offer.24 In cases where the employer 
offered to pay some sickness benefit or provide medical care a ‘receipt’ had to be 
signed and this could release the employer from any liability in tort. The injured were 
thus contractually barred from pursuing a claim. A similar result was achieved by 
later legislation which dealt with the consequences of accepting a statutory payment 
that was on offer without having to prove the employer at fault. If the worker ‘elected’ 
                                                 
19
 Bronstein above n 7 at 35 – 40 notes that support was fragmentary, unpredictable and entirely 
dependent upon the employer’s goodwill. In pre-industrial times injured workers similarly received 
support not only from their extended family but also their masters. A. Wilson and H . Levy, Workmen’s 
Compensation (Oxford: OUP, 1939) vol 1 chap 1 and I. Metzler, A Social History of Disability in the 
Middle Ages (London: Routledge, 2013).    
20
 Bronstein above n 7 at 57 and Friedman above n 11 at 373: ‘The hope of getting or keeping work 
was more important to most workers than the slim chance of winning a lawsuit.’ 
21
 Witt above n 17, at 55. 
22
 Friedman above n 11 at 371.  
23
 Witt above n 17 at 62. Similarly Wilson and Levy above n 19 vol 1 chap 8. In their preface they note 
insurers ‘learnt how to bring the maximum of pressure upon injured workmen to accept less than their 
just dues.’ Kostal above n 5 at 382 records that doctors in the pay of railway companies would secure 
releases from legal liability from the many railwaymen they treated.  
24
 Friedman above n 11, Bronstein above n 7 at 32 – 40. 
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to take this payment his right to sue for damages at common law was lost.25 In reality 
the worker had little choice: no-fault compensation provided an immediate and 
assured amount, whereas the damages suit offered only a remote prospect of obtaining 
an uncertain sum via a very unpredictable route.  
After a decade of trade union pressure, some of the more egregious legal 
constraints on taking action were partly removed by the Employers’ Liability Act 
1880. The Act made an employer liable when a worker was injured in certain specific 
situations although, in effect, these still required proof of wrongdoing. Even then 
many groups of workers were not covered. In limited circumstances the Act also 
removed the defence of common employment whereby a claimant was prevented 
from suing at common law if he were injured by a fellow worker who was also 
employed by the same employer.26 However, the Act did nothing to modify the other 
harsh defences and the compensation that it provided was severely limited. The 
reform was extremely modest with the result that the tort action remained largely 
irrelevant.27 As observed in the USA, in practice the tort system in the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries was one of ‘non-compensation.’28  
Gradually all this changed. Not only was there a shift in workplace power relations 
and the ‘living law’ such as to make tort claims more likely, but also the tort rules 
themselves were further eased. For example, the defences were imposed less readily 
and their effects made less severe. However, claims still remained few and far 
between whether made under the Employers’ Liability Act or at common law.29 Thus 
the trade union, the Iron and Steel Trades Confederation, reported 967 injuries to their 
                                                 
25
 The ‘election’ rule was eventually abolished after criticism from the Report of the Departmental 
Committee on Alternative Remedies (1946, Cmd 6860), chaired by Sir William Monckton. A.F. Young, 
Industrial Injuries Insurance (Routledge, 1964) 152. 
26
 Stein above n 9, T. Ingman, ‘The Rise and Fall of the Doctrine of Common Employment’ [1978] 
Juridical Review 106. 
27
 Simpson above n 5 at 117. 
28
 Friedman above n 11.  
29
 Even as late as 1928-37 an average of only 30 cases a year were brought under the Employers’ 
Liability Act 1880 although others may have been settled out of court. P.W.J. Bartrip, Workmen’s 
Compensation in Twentieth Century Britain (Aldershot: Avebury, 1987) table 10.1 at 220.  
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members in 1937 but in only one case was a tort action brought.30 How many were 
settled out of court remains unclear. In 1948 the bar was removed so as to allow 
claimants to sue in tort as well as claim the new no-fault industrial injuries social 
security benefit. By then, not only did workers have a different perspective upon 
accidents compared to their nineteenth century counterparts, but they had also gained 
the assistance of trade union funded lawyers who could specialise and become expert 
in personal injury work.31 As a result, from the second half of the twentieth century 
litigation substantially increased. By 1973 work injury claims had risen to well over 
100,000 a year and constituted almost half of all personal injury actions brought. 
However, since that time there has been a continued rise in road accident claims with 
the result that work injuries have been much reduced in importance: they now number 
less than one in ten of all injury claims in tort. Nevertheless they still account for 
about 94,000 cases year. 
Looking at the origin of workers compensation it is clear that the failure of the 
common law to compensate injured workers on any scale in the nineteenth century 
was a major reason for the creation of a no-fault system, albeit at first within the 
confines of tort. The Workmen’s Compensation Act 1897 imposed a duty on 
employers to make limited payments to the victims of industrial accidents irrespective 
of whether those injuries were caused by wrongdoing.32 Employers were left to 
arrange their own private insurance to pay the cost of these claims. Despite the fact 
that it lay in private hands, the scheme was called by Beveridge the ‘pioneer of social 
security’ because it contained principles upon which broader welfare measures were 
later built.33 However, Beveridge then made a series of criticisms and concluded that 
the scheme was ‘based on a wrong principle and has been dominated by a wrong 
                                                 
30
 A. Russell-Jones, ‘Workmen’s Compensation, Common Law Remedies and the Beveridge Report’ 
(1944) 7 MLR 13 at 21. 
31
 G. Latta and R. Lewis, ‘Trade Union Legal Services’ (1974) 12 British J Industrial Relations 56. For 
an engaging account of the emergence of the leading trade union law firm see S. Allen, Thompsons: A 
Personal History of the Firm and its Founder (Merlin Press, 2012). 
32
 The nineteenth century history is traced in Bartrip above n 11 and in Stein above n 9. 
33
 Social Insurance and Allied Services: Report by Sir William Beveridge (London: Macmillan, 1942, 
cmd 6404) 79. 
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outlook.’ As a result, the scheme, which had lasted over fifty years, was taken over by 
the state in 1948.34 Statutory no-fault claims in tort were thus displaced by 
applications for benefit payments under the new industrial injuries regime. 
The new social insurance model set up by the Attlee Labour government was a 
core feature of its welfare reforms. Building upon the no-fault principle, it excluded 
private insurers from the system and also discouraged the participation of lawyers. 
New tribunals rather than the traditional courts were used to adjudicate matters in a 
more informal and accessible way. When devising the scheme, it was even questioned 
whether access to tort for work injuries should continue as before: should the 
‘alternative remedy’ be retained? Eventually it was decided that it should, but not 
before the abolition of tort in this area was seriously considered.35 As a result, the 
U.K. is now in a minority of countries to allow both workmen’s compensation and 
tort claims to proceed in parallel. The absence of an ‘employer privilege’ in this 
country restricting tort claims is sometimes overlooked by those academics and 
practitioners who seem to view the ability to sue at common law as almost an 
inalienable right of universal application. 
Since 1948, in spite of a series of reforms designed to reduce expenditure and 
improve efficiency, the no-fault scheme has proved surprisingly resilient. In 1978 it 
was still paying out three times as much as the tort system in total, and there were 
seven times as many beneficiaries.36 It was not until 1995 that tort paid out more 
money for all its injuries than did the industrial scheme for work injuries alone. What 
is the present day importance and scope of the scheme and what has happened to tort 
in the meanwhile? 
3. THE NUMBER OF CLAIMS AND THE COMPENSATION PAID 
Detailed figures concerning social security claims have existed for many years 
largely because public expenditure is involved and greater accountability has been 
                                                 
34
 National Insurance (Industrial Injuries) Act 1946. 
35
 The Monckton Committee above n 25, and P. Bartrip, ‘Beveridge, Workmen’s Compensation and 
the Alternative Remedy’ (1985) 14 J Social Policy 49. 
36
 The Pearson Report above n 2 vol 1 para 772. 
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required.37 By contrast there used to be a paucity of publicly available information 
concerning tort claims for personal injury, although statistical and other analyses were 
privately available to the insurance industry.38 However, from the new millennium the 
Department for Work and Pensions, via its Compensation Recovery Unit, has 
published basic figures for the annual number of tort claims and settlements.39 These 
reveal that in 2015-16 there were 86,000 work injury claims40 which, when added to 
about 25,000 new claims for industrial injury benefit that year,41 makes a total of 
111,000. With over 32 million in employment, this means that about one claim is 
made for every 284 people in work,42 although that figure does not allow for the fact 
                                                 
37
 See eg Department for Work and Pensions, Benefit Expenditure and Caseload Tables 
https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/benefit-expenditure-and-caseload-tables-2016  
38
 For example, the internal statistical information released to official inquiries such as that led by R. 
Jackson LJ, Review of Civil Litigation Costs: Final Report (London: Judiciary of England and Wales, 
January 2010). There have also been various commissioned reports such as those concerning motor 
insurance and produced by the London International Insurance and Reinsurance Market Association 
(LIRMA), UK Bodily Injury Awards Study  (London: LIRMA, 1997, 1999, 2003 and 2007). 
39
 The Unit was set up by Government in 1989 to recover from damages certain social security benefits 
that claimants receive as a result of the tortious injury. All claims for personal injury must now be 
registered whether or not payment eventually results. However, it has only been since 2000 that the 
information about the number of claims and settlements together with the amounts of benefit recovered 
has been published: the Department for Work and Pensions, Compensation Recovery Unit – 
Performance Data https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/compensation-recovery-unit-
performance-data  (hereafter DWP, CRU). The reliability of this data is further considered in R. Lewis, 
A. Morris and K. Oliphant, ‘Tort Personal Injury Claims Statistics: Is there a Compensation Culture in 
the UK?’ (2006) 14 Torts Law Journal 158. For more detail on the figures see R. Lewis and A. Morris 
‘Tort Law Culture: Image and Reality’ (2012) 39 J of Law & Society 562. 
40
 Department for Work and Pensions, Compensation Recovery Unit – Performance Data 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/516771/cases-
registered-cru-2014-15.csv/preview  
41
 Calculated from the Department for Work and Pensions, Industrial Injuries Benefit Quarterly 
Statistics, table 1.5 https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/industrial-injuries-disablement-benefit-
quarterly-statistics-data-to-september-2015 (hereafter DWP, II). 
42
 There were 31.58 million people in full or part-time work in March 2016. Office for National 
Statistics, Statistical Bulletin May 2016. 
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that some of those injured are able to claim both tort damages and industrial benefit. 
In theory the two schemes cover a wide range of injuries that can be suffered at work. 
However, as discussed below, there are various exclusions from the schemes and in 
practice there are also many injured workers who, for a variety of reasons, do not 
bring a claim. 
A. Tort Claims 
In the last forty years or so there has been a 20 per cent fall in the number of work-
related tort claims: they have declined from an estimated 117,000 in 197343 to a 
yearly average of 94,000 in the five years from 2011-16.44 A fall in claims might be 
expected given the decline in employment in traditional industries where danger was 
often present. Few employees are now involved in making iron and steel or in mining 
coal and, as a result, since 1974 there has been in decline in workplace deaths by 86 
per cent and in reported injuries by 77 per cent.45 However, the fall in tort claims is 
nowhere near this level. 
The mere 20 per cent decline in claims since 1973 disguises the fact that work-
related claims within the tort system are now much less important than they used to be 
compared to other types of claim: they have fallen from being 46 per cent of all 
personal injury claims in 197346 to being only 9 per cent now.47 At the same time the 
                                                                                                                                            
https://www.ons.gov.uk/employmentandlabourmarket/peopleinwork/employmentandemployeetypes/bu
lletins/uklabourmarket/may2016  
43
 The Pearson Report above n 2 vol 2 para 63 table 11. 
44
 DWP above n 40. 
45
 Health and Safety Executive, http://www.hse.gov.uk/STATISTICS/history/index.htm However, 
there are difficulties in making comparisons because of changes in the method of compiling the figures. 
See also R. Lofstedt, Reclaiming Health and Safety for All: An Independent Review of Health and 
Safety Legislation (HMSO, Cm 8219, 2011) chap 3 para 13.  
46
 The Pearson Report above n 2 vol 2 table 11. In 1968 work injuries were found to constitute 62 per 
cent of all High Court actions by the Winn Committee, Report of the Committee on Personal Injuries 
Litigation (1968, cmnd 3691) 233. 
47
 There were 86,495 employment claims out of a total of 981,324 in 2015-16. DWP above n 40. Work 
injury settlements, rather than new claims made, comprised about 10 per cent of the total and numbered 
99,329. DWP, CRU above n 39. 
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total number of claims from all injures has quadrupled to almost a million. The main 
reason for this lies in the rapid rise of motor claims which have almost doubled in the 
last ten years and now constitute almost four out of five cases.48 It has long been the 
case that a smaller proportion of those injured at work sue in tort compared to those 
who are injured by motor vehicles. In 1978 it was suggested that whereas one in four 
injured following a road accident made a claim, only one in ten did so following a 
work accident, and only one in 67 did so if they were injured elsewhere.49 More 
recently, on the basis of self-reporting statistics, the Trades Union Congress estimates 
that it is still the case that the rate of claiming is low with only one in seven people 
injured at work going on to seek compensation.50 ‘Lumping it’ is still a common 
response to injury.51 
The fact that work injury claims in tort are only reduced slightly from what they 
were forty years ago does not mean that they have always been around the same 
figure. In particular, there was an exceptional period in the five years from 1999 when 
claims rose rapidly. They reached a peak of 291,000 in 2004, three times as many as 
today. The increase resulted from the creation of temporary special schemes of 
compensation for coalmining diseases and injuries. The claims of miners in respect of 
respiratory disease and for the effects of using vibrating tools led to settlement 
schemes which were called by the Department of Trade and Industry ‘the biggest 
personal injury schemes in British legal history and possibly the world.’ During the 
                                                 
48
 Motor claims accounted for 78 per cent being 770,791 of the total of 981,324 in 2015-16. DWP 
above n 40.  Reasons for the rise in claims are examined in R. Lewis, ‘Structural Factors Affecting the 
Number and Cost of Personal Injury Claims in Tort’ in E. Quill and R. Friel (eds), Damages and 
Compensation Culture (Oxford: Hart Publications, 2016) 37 – 59 and R. Lewis, ‘Compensation 
Culture Reviewed: Incentives to Claim and Damages Levels’ [2014] J of Personal Injury Law 209. 
49
 The Pearson Report above n 2 vol 1 table 5. The table also revealed that overall only 6.5 per cent of 
all accident victims are compensated by the tort system. However, if only serious injuries are 
considered tort was more important: almost a third of claimants received tort damages where an 
accident caused incapacity for work for six months or more. 
50
 Trades Union Council and the Association of Personal Injury Lawyers, The Compensation Myth: 
Seven Myths about the ‘Compensation Culture’ (2014). 
51
 For examination of why so many injured people do not make a claim in the USA see D. Engel, The 
Myths of a Litigious Society: Why We Don’t Sue (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2016). 
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five years from 1999 when claims were allowed about 760,000 were registered. 52 
Following the closure of these schemes in 2004 the annual number of employers’ 
liability claims has fallen by two thirds to its current average of 94,000. 
B. Benefit Claims 
 Following the introduction of the state’s industrial injury scheme in 1948 the 
number of claims increased every year for the first 16 years: they rose from 16,000 in 
1949 to a peak of 214,000 in 1965. Since then they have been almost decimated and 
now stand at only 25,000.53 The decline has not been even. Thus in the ten years from 
1965 they fell by a third to 143,000 whereas just over ten years later they were 17 per 
cent lower at 119,000.54 In these twenty years to 1985 they had fallen by almost half 
from their peak. In part the decline reflected greater safety in working conditions but 
it was also caused by reforms of the industrial scheme itself such as when short-term 
injury benefit was abolished and later when reduced earnings allowance was 
withdrawn. There were some exceptional years when claimant numbers rose. This 
happened especially after new entitlement was established or further extended for 
particular diseases. However, generally claims continued to fall significantly so that in 
1998 there were 75,000, ten years later 40,000, and now there are only 25,000. The 
decline means that for every benefit claim under the scheme there are almost four 
others that are brought in tort. Therefore, it is clear that, although once of comparable 
importance, the industrial scheme now compensates many fewer newly injured 
workers than tort. 
 However, against this must be balanced the fact that there are 301,000 industrial 
disablement pensions currently in payment. 55 This is three times the annual number 
of settlements in tort for work injuries.56 The high number of pensions is the result of 
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the accumulation of entitlement over many years. Although every year there are many 
more people receiving industrial benefit compared to tort damages, this is only 
because the benefit is paid as a pension in contrast to the single lump sum usually 
awarded in tort. The old injuries continue to affect the figures. 
Another consequence of the build-up of pensions in the system is that the average 
age profile of the recipients has markedly increased: about two thirds of recipients are 
now aged over 60. Apart from age, there is also a clear sexual division with four times 
as many men than women receiving the pension.57 On average, claimants are assessed 
as suffering between 30 and 40 per cent disablement and receive about £54 a week.58 
The maximum award is £168 but even this is less than a third of the average gross 
weekly wage.59 
C. Total Compensation Paid 
When combined, the tort and industrial injury system provide injured workers with 
about £1.6 billion a year. Here the industrial scheme is the senior partner accounting 
for almost a billion of that expenditure so that it distributes half as much again to 
injured workers than tort. This is again because of the accumulation of pensions in the 
scheme. In 2014-15 £963 million was spent on the industrial benefit.60 This is about 
20 per cent lower than the highest level reached almost thirty years ago in 1986-87 
when the equivalent of £1,209 million was spent. The fall in the expenditure does not 
match the sharp decline in the number of claims over that period. This is because the 
pensions awarded from those claims can last a lifetime and thus affect the expenditure 
figure for many years. In a broader context, expenditure upon both tort and industrial 
injuries benefit are of limited significance when compared to overall expenditure on 
welfare benefits: they account for only 0.9 per cent of the total of £168 billion. 
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If we turn to expenditure on tort alone, the figures are less precise. Although we 
have data on the annual number of claims and settlements, no official statistics are 
produced on the monies paid out each year. However, insurers have revealed that in 
the five years to 2008 they paid out about £1.5 billion a year in settlements of 
employers’ tort liability cases but this also included the claimants’ legal costs.61 On 
average there were about 186,000 such settlements a year during that five year period. 
The average amount per settlement was therefore about £8,000. With claimant legal 
costs constituting about 30 per cent of the total,62 claimants themselves received on 
average about £5,000, the equivalent of a little over three months average weekly 
earnings. This is in line with findings made in earlier studies.63 Following the ending 
of the special schemes of compensation for miners,64 settlements since 2008 have 
fallen by half and numbered only 99,000 in 2015-16. However, the amounts paid have 
increased for a variety of reasons related to the way in which damages are assessed.65 
We can therefore roughly estimate that, excluding payment for legal costs, the amount 
of damages actually distributed to claimants is about £600 million a year. This is less 
than two thirds of the monies distributed in benefits under the industrial scheme. 
4. THE EXTENT OF COVERAGE 
Under the industrial scheme benefit ‘shall be payable where an employed earner 
suffers personal injury caused … by accident arising out of and in the course of 
                                                 
61
 Association of British Insurers statistics cited by the Department for Work and Pensions, Accessing 
Compensation: Supporting People Who Need to Trace Employers Liability Insurance Consultation 
Paper (2010) para 31. https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/accessing-compensation-
supporting-people-who-need-to-trace-employers-liability-insurance  
62
 International Underwriting Association of London, Fourth UK Bodily Injury Awards Study (2007) 
para 7.21 and see below n 130 and 131and accompanying text.  
63
 P. Fenn and N. Rickman, Costs of Low Value Liability Claims 1997-2002 recorded average damages 
of £3,000 for employers’ liability accident claims. In a survey of conditional fee claimants in 2011 half 
of them received less than £5,000. Insight Delivery Consultancy, No Win No Fee Usage in the UK  
appendix 5 of the Access to Justice Action Group, Comments on Reforming Civil Litigation Funding 
http://www.accesstojusticeactiongroup.co.uk/home/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/NWNF-research.pdf . 
64
 Above n 52 and accompanying text. 
65
 The reasons for this are discussed in Lewis above n 48. 
 16 
employment ….’66 These words are examined here in outline to highlight some key 
aspects of entitlement and to draw comparisons with tort.     
A. The ‘Employed Earner’ and the Self-employed 
By compensating only ‘employed earners’ the industrial scheme confines its 
benefits to the 26 million workers who are employed as opposed to the 5 million or so 
who are self-employed.67 Although it has been argued that the latter are just as 
deserving of compensation, concern has been raised that if they were brought within 
the industrial scheme it would create uncertainty because of the greater difficulty in 
identifying whether they are in the course of their employment when they are injured. 
A recommendation that at least those who work in construction and agriculture and 
are self-employed be brought within the scheme has not been implemented.68  
In comparing tort we similarly find that the primary common law duties are only 
owed to employees. However, where the tort action is based on vicarious liability 
anyone who is injured can sue. In that respect tort has wider coverage because 
claimants can include not only those who are in business for themselves but also, for 
example, visitors to the workplace or members of the public injured on the roads or 
elsewhere by the negligent employee when doing his job. 
B. ‘Personal Injury’ and the Treatment of Minor Claims 
Unlike tort, the industrial scheme has two measures designed to exclude small 
claims from being brought. However, in practice both systems are overwhelmingly 
concerned with minor injuries. The two threshold requirements in the industrial 
scheme are, first, that disablement continues for at least 15 weeks before entitlement 
can arise; and second, that a minimum of 14 per cent disablement be suffered.69 In 
effect, this means that the claimant must suffer at least the equivalent of the loss of an 
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index finger in order to recover any benefit; any other finger can be lost and will give 
rise to no claim. Even with the exclusions resulting from this threshold the great 
majority of successful claimants suffer only minor injury with about half being 
assessed at less than 24 per cent disabled.70 
A major distinguishing feature of tort, therefore, is that it does not have any 
requirement that a minimum loss be suffered before entitlement can arise. However, 
in practice, the system is similarly pre-occupied with small claims. As we have seen, 
the average payment in tort for an industrial injury is about £5,000.71 It can be said 
that both tort and the industrial scheme devote disproportionate resources to minor 
injuries. By contrast, many of those seriously disabled are likely not to have their 
needs met. 
C. ‘Personal Injury’ and Mental Injury 
 Both tort and the industrial scheme accept that personal injury includes injury to 
the mind as well as the body. Tort devotes considerable resources to compensating the 
mental consequences that follow from physical injury no matter how relatively trivial 
the pain and suffering. In contrast, the industrial scheme spends very little on mental 
injury. Assessments under both systems are heavily dominated by anatomical loss 
with mental effects usually being compensated only when parasitic upon the physical 
injury. Thus the industrial scheme uses a very crude table of physical losses which 
result in prescribed percentages of disablement and these, in turn, equate to a set level 
of pension. Mental injury is not even listed in this table, but if medically established, 
it can be taken into account as a ‘non-prescribed condition’ to increase the percentage 
of disablement found. However, in practice, it rarely does so. If we compare how 
assessments in tort are reached, we find a much more detailed booklet being used 
instead of the basic industrial injuries table. The Judicial College’s Guidelines for the 
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Assessment of Damages in Personal Injury Cases72 is a text that should be ‘packed in 
every judge’s lunch bag’73 for it provides the parameters within which awards for pain 
and suffering are to be assessed. However, like the industrial table, the descriptions of 
injury are almost exclusively concerned with the physical effects and the guidance on 
assessing mental injury is very limited. 
In theory, even if the claimant does not suffer physically he may claim for a mental 
condition alone if it is the result of an accident caused by his job. On this basis, for 
example, benefit was paid where the claimant developed a neurosis after witnessing 
the death of another employee at work.74 In tort these ‘pure’ mental injury cases 
occupy many pages of student textbooks. They are a primary concern for those 
chapters dealing with the problem areas when determining the scope of the duty of 
care. However, in practice these cases are much less significant than the books imply. 
For example, post-traumatic stress disorder is a factor in less 5,000 of the million 
personal injury claims brought each year and in the great majority of these cases 
physical injury is also involved.75 ‘Pure’ mental injury unaccompanied by physical 
injury is rarely litigated. Overall, in spite of work being recognised as a major cause 
of stress and mental illness, there is only limited acknowledgement of this in tort.76 
Even worse, there is almost no such recognition in the industrial scheme. Stress-
related illnesses are not included on the list of prescribed diseases allowed under the 
industrial scheme and, as a result, very few of them are compensated.77 To succeed 
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claimants must bring themselves within the accident provisions by showing that their 
mental state results from a specific disturbing event. As a result, for example, a fire 
officer failed in his claim for post-traumatic stress disorder which he claimed resulted 
from attending a series of horrific fatal crashes because he could not show which 
precise incidents had actually contributed to his mental state.78 With such onerous 
causation requirements, it is not surprising that most employees suffering the usual 
stress-related illnesses find it very difficult to claim under the industrial scheme and 
instead are forced to try their luck in tort. 
D.  The ‘Course of Employment,’ Fault and Contributory Negligence 
One of the two ways in which entitlement to benefit arises under the industrial 
scheme is by establishing an ‘accident arising out of and in the course of 
employment.’79   These words originated in the Workmen’s Compensation Act 1897. It 
has been suggested that they have given rise to more litigation than any other in the 
English language.80 Lord Denning thought that the phrase ‘has been worth – to 
lawyers – a King’s ransom.’81 The course of employment has caused similar 
problems, of course, in relation to tort when the vicarious liability of an employer is in 
issue. Interpretation of the phrase under the workmen’s compensation regime was 
more generous and in recent years this has affected the development of the common 
law. Liability in tort has been extended, partly influenced by the idea of enterprise risk 
which lay behind the interpretation under the workmen’s compensation legislation.82 
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Although this is not the place to examine course of employment in detail,83 one 
aspect can be mentioned here: how does any fault of the claimant affect entitlement to 
benefit? At first sight it may appear that tort is very different from the industrial 
scheme because it requires proof of fault whereas wrongdoing seems to have little 
part to play in a claim for benefit. In particular, the defence of contributory negligence 
reduces damages in perhaps about a quarter of all tort claims84 whereas no such 
percentage reduction can take place under the industrial scheme. Critics of the fault 
principle argue that it is an uncertain standard, difficult and expensive to apply, and it 
often does not correspond to popular notions of moral responsibility for causing 
injury.85 Supporters of the benefit system therefore celebrate the absence of fault from 
the state scheme. However, this difference between the two schemes may not be quite 
so stark. This is because, if the claimant’s conduct creates a new or different risk from 
that which arises from the employment and this risk is the real cause of the accident, 
then the injury will not arise out of and in the course of employment and the claim 
will fail entirely. This argument can have a greater effect than contributory negligence 
in tort because it may deny all benefit under the scheme instead of leading to only to a 
partial reduction in compensation. This is illustrated by the refusal of any industrial 
benefit to employees who were injured when they left their place of work for their 
own purposes by going off to explore another part of the building.86 However, in more 
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recent times a less strict view has been taken of the scope of employment and it is 
now required that the claimant’s conduct must create a new or different risk before 
benefit is denied.87 Overall, therefore, this offers only a very limited possibility to use 
the fault of the claimant to deny benefit. It cannot compare with the frequency and 
effect of such arguments made in tort. 
E. Accidents and Diseases 
Under the industrial scheme there are only two routes to obtaining benefit: the 
claimant must show that injury is either the result of an ‘accident’ or a ‘prescribed 
disease.’ Unlike tort where claims for disease are open-ended, the industrial scheme 
confines claims almost entirely to those appearing on a legislative list which also 
prescribes the occupations or work processes with which they may be associated.88 
Against this limiting factor must be balanced a particular advantage given to 
claimants under the scheme and which is not enjoyed by those who sue in tort: 
proving causation of a prescribed disease is made much easier by statutory 
presumptions which help establish the necessary work connection with a particular 
employment. This means that if the claimant has worked in a listed occupation for the 
minimum specified time and develops the relevant disease it is presumed that it has 
been caused by the employment. 
Historically the accident route has been the more important than that for disease 
even though there is evidence that the victims of disease are more likely to have 
serious medical needs and be left with residual incapacity.89 Of the 275,000 
disablement benefit pensions still in payment no matter when entitlement first arose 
there are 201,000 being paid for accidents compared to only 74,000 for prescribed 
diseases.90 However, this disguises the fact that disease has become much more 
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important in recent years. The nature of work has changed. When the industrial 
scheme was introduced in 1948 almost two thirds of jobs were in heavy industry 
whereas today 70 per cent of employees work in office and service industries. As a 
result, accidents are less common and, with increasing scientific recognition of the 
effects of work upon health, diseases now constitute the majority of new claims. In 
2014 there were 13,000 disease claims, over 2,000 more than there were for 
accidents.91 There is a notable division between the sexes with women being much 
less likely to suffer from industrial disease: of new claimants, only 7 per cent are 
women whereas, for accidents, they constitute 30 per cent of the total.92 In addition, it 
can be argued that the industrial scheme has failed to recognise the occupational cause 
of many diseases which are compensated in other countries. The Industrial Injuries 
Advisory Council has been accused of adopting a very conservative approach to 
prescribing new conditions and using unfair epidemiological tests. As a result, for 
example, only a fraction of occupational cancers recognised by the Health and Safety 
Executive result in compensation under the scheme.93  
Deafness, vibration white finger and pneumoconiosis account for almost half of the 
74,000 prescribed disease pensions which are presently in payment.94 This figure 
again reflects old claims and the continuance of awards in the system resulting from 
the risks of work years ago. Two thirds of new awards are made to men over pension 
age.95 Of new awards, diseases associated with asbestos now account for about a third 
of the total, with the onset of mesothelioma typically occurring thirty to fifty years 
after first exposure. The next most important disease is pneumoconiosis followed by 
the osteoarthritis of the knee which was first prescribed for coalminers only in 2009.96 
By contrast, cases of occupational deafness have declined to less than two per cent of 
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new cases.97 It may surprise some that none of these cases are recorded as involving 
women,98 but the reason is that the conservatively specified occupations are in 
industries that traditionally have been dominated by men. 
When we turn to consider the tort system there is again much less publicly 
available information than for the industrial scheme. However, we do know that tort is 
similar to the industrial scheme in compensating more men than women: only about a 
quarter of all claims for work injuries are brought by women.99 A freedom of 
information request has also revealed that tort is like the industrial scheme in that 
diseases are of growing importance to employers’ liability claims. From 2012-16 
disease claims averaged 33,000 a year, almost three times as many as there were 
under the industrial scheme. However, unlike under the scheme, accidents were more 
important than diseases: they outnumbered them by about two to one.100 If we turn to 
consider the tort system in general - no matter what the cause of injury - the 
significance of disease diminishes greatly: for each disease claim made there are 29 
based on accident.101 With road traffic accidents now dominating the system this 
reflects the fact that disease is not relevant to such claims. 
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Despite this rise in claims for certain diseases, tort continues to make it difficult to 
succeed in an action for many other types of illness. Traditional problems persist of 
proving that the employer was at fault and that it was work that in fact was the cause 
of the disease.102 Some conditions are especially hard to litigate. For example, 
although the Health and Safety Executive suggest that, stress, anxiety and depression 
are second only to musculoskeletal disorders as the causes of occupational health 
problems, they constitute only two per cent of the occupational disease claims brought 
in tort.103 
In spite of this, we can still say that the common law is increasingly recognising 
the wider effects of work upon health as we gain more knowledge about the risks 
involved. We now have a better understanding, for example, not only of the concealed 
dangers of asbestos but also of the effects of repetitive manual movements or of 
excessive of noise at work. This has resulted in many new claims for disease being 
brought. There have been times when claims have multiplied within a short period. 
For example, as noted above, large scale settlement schemes were put in place to 
satisfy the claims of miners suffering not only from respiratory disease but also from 
the effects of using of vibrating tools. From 1999 to 2004 there were 760,000 such 
claims registered. Under the respiratory disease scheme £2,300 million was paid out, 
and under the vibration scheme a further £1,700 million.104 Whereas the median 
award for vibration was £8,300, for respiratory disease it was only £1,500. The cost of 
administration was very high: lawyers’ costs under the respiratory scheme averaged 
£1,920 out of a total cost of £3,200 required to administer each claim.105 These 
settlements have all now been concluded and this accounts for the substantial fall in 
the number of disease claims in the recent figures. The fall masks the underlying trend 
which reveals the growing importance of disease in employer’s liability and the extent 
that occupational ill-health is a major underlying cause of disability and suffering. 
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5. THE COMPENSATION AVAILABLE 
A. Full Compensation and the Emphasis on Non-Pecuniary Loss 
On the surface there appears to be stark contrast between the two systems with 
regard to the amounts of compensation they can provide. Their aims when assessing 
the claimant’s loss seem very distinct. However, as shown below, the practical effect 
of these differences is much less than might be supposed.  
Tort aims to provide full compensation in order to return the claimant as close as 
possible to the pre-accident position.106 In theory it tailors the compensation to the 
circumstances of each individual by making a very subjective assessment of the loss 
suffered. By contrast assessment under the industrial scheme compares the claimant to 
a person of the same age and sex who is of normal health. This objective approach 
ignores the claimant’s own personal or social circumstances. Instead disablement 
benefit is mechanically fixed by using simple tables which prescribe the degrees of 
disability to be associated with the loss of faculty, almost all being based upon 
anatomical loss. All in the same bracket get the same award irrespective of the extent 
that their injury affects their everyday living. These differences between the two 
systems account, on the one hand, for the eye-catching news coverage given to tort 
claimants who receive multi-million pound awards and, on the other, the relative 
anonymity of beneficiaries under the industrial scheme. But how far does the 
portrayal in the media accurately reflect the scope and importance of each scheme? 
A major reason for the potential difference in payment in the two systems is that 
tort tries to compensate in full for financial losses whereas the industrial scheme 
almost entirely ignores such claims whether they are for loss of earnings or the cost of 
care. Instead disablement benefit, in effect, is a payment exclusively based on non-
pecuniary loss.107 However, if we look at how tort actually compensates in practice 
this difference is much less marked. Partly because of the dominance of small claims 
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for minor injury, most tort claims involve very little, if any, financial loss. A key fact 
insufficiently emphasised in tort texts is that two thirds of the total damages paid are 
actually for non-pecuniary loss108 with by far the most common type of claim 
involving a motor accident which causes minor neck injury and no financial loss.109 In 
practice, therefore, both tort and the industrial scheme focus their attention on the 
non-financial effects of injury. In doing so they privilege what has been classified as a 
secondary, less important, form of compensation compared to the primary need for 
replacement of direct financial loss. Despite this, it remains true that only in tort is full 
compensation possible and only in tort can lump sums be paid which, when they take 
into account lost earnings and care costs, can be in seven figures. The highest one per 
cent of awards account for almost a third of the total damages.110 It is in these unusual 
cases that the industrial scheme cannot begin to match tort damages even if the capital 
value of the social security pension is taken into account as described below. 
Thirty years ago there were several different benefits available under the industrial 
scheme but today only disablement benefit remains. Although loss of earnings is not 
covered by the scheme today, this was not always the case. Reduced earnings 
allowance was available and used to account for 40 per cent of expenditure on the 
industrial scheme. Although it was abolished in 1990, past entitlement has been 
maintained. This means that there are 97,000 old pensions for reduced earnings 
allowance still in payment compared to the 205,000 pensions for disablement benefit 
alone.111 The allowance was withdrawn because of its complexity and, in particular, 
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because of the burden of determining the precise reduction in earnings. This was in 
spite of a maximum award being set which, in practice, prevented 90 per cent of 
claimants from obtaining their full loss. If we compare tort, a similar precise 
calculation must be made to assess exactly the pounds and pence lost. This very 
subjective approach is watered down in practice by the use of several rough and ready 
rules but the computation still demands the use of high resources and is one of reasons 
for the tort system being so expensive to operate as discussed below. 
B. Lump Sums versus Pensions and their Capitalised Values 
A major distinction between the two systems lies in how the compensation is 
delivered: whereas the industrial scheme pays benefits exclusively by means of a 
pension,112 the great majority of tort awards take the form of a once-and-for-all lump 
sum. Although this single payment is obviously the most efficient way of disposing of 
the mass of small claims, it has attracted much criticism especially when it has proven 
insufficient in cases of long-term serious injury. There are a number of reasons to 
account for this potentially inadequate provision. For example, the lump sum cannot 
be reviewed later to cater for an unforeseen deterioration in the claimant’s 
condition.113 In contrast, a disablement pension can be increased if the original injury 
becomes worse. Again, whereas the traditional lump sum cannot be supplemented if 
the claimant outlives the life expectancy projected when the award was made, 
entitlement under the industrial scheme continues to protect the long-lived. As long as 
disablement continues, payments can endure through incapacity, unemployment and 
retirement and may end only on death, no matter at what age. Disablement pensions 
also enjoy the protection against price inflation given to other welfare payments. In 
contrast, recipients of tort awards in the past have seen their monies eroded by a 
combination of inflation and market fluctuations which affect the return they are 
expected to make by investing their lump sum. To counter some of these criticisms a 
new way of paying damages has been developed. In some tort cases involving very 
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serious injury it is now possible to obtain periodical payments instead of the lump 
sum.114 The regular payments can be arranged to be free of tax and can be indexed to 
protect against inflation. Crucially, they can avoid the artificial presumptions upon 
which the lump sum has been based and which have diminished its value over time.115 
However, they still cannot readily protect against unforeseen deteriorations in the 
claimant’s medical condition. 
The value of an industrial injuries pension can be very high if assessed in capital 
terms. This is partly because it can last for life and is protected against inflation, as 
just discussed, but also because it is tax free and is not means-tested. Generally, the 
pension does not lead to a reduction in other contributory benefits available under the 
main social security scheme. As a result, if attention is confined to minor or moderate 
injuries, the capitalised value of the pension can often compare very favourably with 
the lump sum in tort. To illustrate this, consider the case of a recipient of disablement 
benefit who has lost an eye and is assessed as 40 per cent disabled, this being only a 
little higher than the average award under the scheme of 30 per cent. In 2016-17 the 
resulting pension is £67.20 a week amounting to £3,494 a year. If this claimant is 
aged 21 at the date of injury the lifetime capitalised value of the pension based on the 
recently revised presumptions now used in tort is £304,467.116 Even if the claimant 
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were aged 60, the capital value based on these actuarial tables is still £101,937. By 
contrast the non-pecuniary valuation in tort for the loss of an eye is between £45,840 
and £55,000.117 Under the industrial scheme the younger the worker the more 
valuable their total pension, whereas in tort age rarely affects the non-pecuniary 
damages paid unless the claimant is very old. The overall comparison illustrates that, 
over the course of their lifetime, almost all workers suffering lesser injury obtain far 
more for their non-pecuniary loss from the industrial injuries system than they would 
for pain and suffering and loss of amenity in tort. However, it must be remembered 
that the industrial scheme, unlike tort, offers nothing for any earnings loss or for the 
cost of any private care that may be needed. 
The comparison can be taken further by examining what would happen in the case 
of the most catastrophic injury, such as quadriplegia or severe brain damage. The 
maximum basic pension which could be awarded by the industrial scheme is £168 a 
week, equivalent to £8,736 a year.118 For a 21 year old the capitalised value of the 
basic pension is £761,255 and for a 60 year old it is £254,916. These figures are again 
comparable with the prescribed amounts of between £271,000 and £337,000 awarded 
in tort for the most severe injury. Indeed, for younger claimants the scheme in effect 
pays twice as much as tort does for non-pecuniary loss. However, we must remember 
that the tort system would also take into account the financial losses and care costs 
incurred. This means that invariably in such a case, especially if a high income earner 
is involved, the award in tort would run into millions of pounds and the difference 
with the industrial scheme would then be very apparent. 
6. ADJUDICATION AND ADMINISTRATIVE COST 
As part of general social security provision, the industrial injuries scheme is 
administered by the Department for Work and Pensions. Claims are determined by the 
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Department without a hearing and on the basis of the paperwork alone. 
Documentation may include advice from doctors who have been especially trained in 
disability analysis. Partly because of the medical questions that may have to be 
resolved, adjudication is often more complicated than in other social security cases. 
This complexity also makes it more likely that claimants will challenge the decision 
so that there were 1,773 appeals to tribunals from the 25,000 claims for benefit in 
2015-16.119  
Tribunals are very different from those courts which determined workmen’s 
compensation cases before the system was taken over by the state in 1948. Under the 
old system  
‘… workmen’s compensation descended from its lofty ideals of being a no-fault 
social service into a squalid legal battlefield between trade unions and insurance 
companies, with lying, cheating, and chicanery on all sides and astronomical 
expenditure on administrative, legal and medical costs.’120  
In perhaps less forceful language it may be argued that tort claims today share some 
of these features. With employers being required to insure against their liability, in 
effect the tort system is similarly administered by private insurers. The practices of 
these insurance companies are essential to the understanding of how the tort system 
actually works.121 In 98 per cent of tort cases the claim is settled out of court,122 and 
the factors affecting the bargains that are struck are very different to the strict rules of 
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law that would be applied by a judge in a court hearing.123 Especially in cases of low 
value, rough and ready rules of thumb are applied to dispose of many claims as 
efficiently as possible and limit the bill for costs. 
Insurers process these routine payments and they decide which elements of damage 
they will accept or contest. It is unusual for them to contest liability, one study 
revealing that insurers’ files ‘contained remarkably little discussion of liability’, 
finding it initially denied in only 20 per cent of cases.124 As a result, insurers make at 
least some payment in the great majority of personal injury claims, often because the 
costs are such that they are not worth contesting too vigorously. It has been suggested 
that about 95 per cent of work injury cases supported by trade union solicitors result 
in some payment to the claimant.125 Tort thus provides a structure for processing mass 
payments of small amounts of compensation before any formal legal proceedings are 
begun. Court litigation is very much the exception rather than the norm. 
In contrast, private insurers have no part to play in the state-run industrial injuries 
scheme. All claims are adjudicated and there is no scope for informal bargaining. 
There is no question of a claimant accepting a deal outside the tribunal for a lesser 
sum than that to which he is entitled. Nor is contributory negligence to be applied 
with all its vagueness and uncertainty. There is only limited room to manoeuvre for 
those administering the industrial scheme. Unlike in tort where the calculation of 
damages is a key issue, almost all disputes focus upon basic entitlement to benefit 
rather than the amount due. On appeal, the tribunal system offers an efficient, cheap 
and speedy system of justice.126 Although the procedure is much less formal, work 
injury cases differ from other social security cases because claimants are more likely 
to be assisted by their trade union and sometimes represented by a lawyer. 
                                                 
123
 H. Genn, Hard Bargaining: Out of Court Settlement in Personal Injury Actions (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1987) and, in the USA, H. L. Ross, Settled Out of Court: The Social Process of Insurance 
Claims Adjustment (Chicago: Aldine, 1970). R. Lewis, ‘Tort Tactics: An Empirical Study of Personal 
Injury Litigation Strategies’ (2017) 37 Legal Studies 162. 
124
 T. Goriely, R. Moorhead and P. Abrams, More Civil Justice? The Impact of the Woolf Reforms on 
Pre-Action Behaviour (London: The Law Society and the Civil Justice Council, 2002) at 103. 
125
 Citizens Advice Bureau, No Win, No Fee, No Chance (2004) para 4.31. 
126
 J. Baldwin, N. Wikeley, and R. Young, Judging Social Security (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992). 
 32 
In 2007 the administrative cost of paying disablement benefit was said to be only 
two per cent of the total cost of the scheme.127 In contrast, fourteen years earlier the 
cost was said to be 11 per cent of the benefit expenditure.128 Whatever the exact figure 
and however it is calculated, the costs sharply contrast with common law litigation: 
the tort system consumes in operating costs 45 per cent of the total of the damages 
paid and the administrative expenditure. This applies to all claims disposed of by the 
system irrespective of whether formal proceedings are begun (when costs are likely to 
increase substantially). It means that for each pound spent on the tort system overall 
only 55 pence goes to the claimant, and that for each pound the claimant receives 
about another 85 pence is consumed in costs.129 Such eye-watering figures are partly 
the result of including not only the legal costs of both sides but also the insurers’ 
wider costs and their profits from being involved in the system. Claimants’ legal costs 
alone account for about 30 per cent of the damages awarded.130 In particular areas, 
especially where claims are of low value and get as far as court, these costs will far 
exceed the damages payable.131 For example, in hearing loss claims in 2013 whereas 
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claimants received damages which averaged £3,100 their legal costs were £10,400.132 
Both tort and the industrial scheme focus upon minor injury claims where costs are 
likely to be out of proportion to the compensation paid. But only in the industrial 
scheme - where there are no insurers, fewer lawyers and a simplified procedure - is 
the costs ratio within what many would view as acceptable limits.  
Whereas benefit claims are resolved within three to eight months, tort claims take 
much longer. Even though small sums are usually involved, the majority take between 
one and two years to process and settle.133  If a case goes to court the time taken is 
much longer, averaging between three and five years.134 The more serious the injury, 
the longer the time it takes. As a result it can be said: 
‘If it were not for the social security system, which provides many claimants 
with benefits during the settlement process, the tort system would probably have 
collapsed long ago.’135  
In this sense, any later action begun in tort may be seen as merely supplementary to 
the benefit claim. However, in the minority of cases where there is serious injury and 
substantial financial loss the large lump sum award of damages can make the weekly 
benefit payment look insignificant and merely peripheral to the tort litigation. 
7. CONCLUSION 
 In reconsidering the relationship between the tort system and that for industrial 
injuries this article has explored the effect of each in practice. In particular, the 
statistics revealed here support findings which may surprise some readers. Just over 
twenty years ago the industrial scheme was providing more compensation in total than 
all the damages paid for personal injury in tort no matter where the injury occurred. 
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With the exponential rise of motor claims in tort, the industrial scheme has now been 
overtaken. However, it still distributes more money each year than the tort system 
does for work injuries alone. It pays out half as much again as tort and it continues to 
compensate three times as many workers.  
 Although true, these statistics can easily mislead. Most of the beneficiaries under 
the industrial scheme first started receiving their pensions some years ago and these 
old injuries have accumulated in the system. For new accidents and diseases tort is far 
more important for it deals with almost four times as many claimants a year. Although 
in historical terms, therefore, the two systems can be seen as of comparable value, it is 
clear that today tort is the more significant source of compensation for those who are 
newly injured. In addition, for the minority who are seriously injured, tort is 
unchallenged in potentially providing full compensation for the loss suffered. 
Traditionally both schemes have found it difficult to compensate claims involving 
mental injury and stress. The work connection has been difficult to prove. That same 
reason accounts for diseases in general having had only a minor role to play compared 
to accidents. However, this is now changing. Under the industrial scheme diseases 
constitute the majority of new awards whilst in tort they constitute a third of all work-
related claims. Even though this may be only the tip of the iceberg of occupational ill-
heath, the statistics gathered here offer a fresh perspective on the growing importance 
of disease to the two regimes. 
In other respects the schemes on the surface appear to have very different bases of 
entitlement: whereas the tort claim is supposedly founded upon proof of another’s 
wrongdoing, the state scheme operates irrespective of fault. However, when we look 
more closely this distinction may not be quite so clear. Both systems use the ‘course 
of employment’ formula to determine the work relationship and, in theory, fault of the 
claimant can then be raised in relation to both schemes. In addition, although the tort 
system emphasises fault more, in practice many smaller claims are settled without 
contesting the issue. In effect, both schemes largely provide mechanisms for paying 
small amounts of money irrespective of wrongdoing to those who suffer minor injury. 
When we compare the compensation offered, although there seem to be stark 
differences in theory between the two systems, these are again much reduced in 
practice. Unlike tort, the state scheme does not profess to embark on a subjective 
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assessment of the claimant’s loss in order to restore the position enjoyed before injury 
took place. In particular, nothing is paid for any financial losses whether for lost 
earnings or the costs of care. In catastrophic injury cases the benefit claim is therefore 
much less important than the millions of pounds potentially available from tort. 
However, for younger claimants suffering the most serious injury, the pension paid 
under the industrial scheme can still equate to a lump sum value of around £750,000.  
Such serious injury cases are few and far between. Instead both systems 
predominantly deal with minor claims. It is then that the capitalised value of the social 
security pension can often be shown to greatly exceed that portion of the damages 
award which is paid for non-pecuniary loss. In many cases the value of the pension 
will exceed even the total damages paid in tort whether for pain and suffering or 
financial loss. Tort can then be seen as the less important source of compensation. It is 
thus essential to examine what both systems offer in the long-term before conclusions 
can be drawn about the true value of what they provide. 
Finally, if we compare how claims under the two regimes are administered and at 
what cost we again find very considerable differences but this time what happens in 
practice does not bring them closer together. Instead they are drawn even further 
apart. In tort the rough and ready factors applied to settle almost all claims out of 
court stand in contrast to the formal rule-based adjudication evident in the 
applications for benefit. It is somewhat ironic that lawyers play a major role in the 
informal settlement system of tort but rarely feature in the other. Tort negotiations 
predominantly focus upon the amount of damages claimed whereas disablement 
benefit disputes are more concerned with basic entitlement rather than final value. 
The speedier and cheaper resolution of claims under the industrial scheme may 
indicate a simpler and less personal process but may also point to major criticisms of 
tort. When the cost of administration is almost as much as the compensation paid to 
claimants it must be questioned whether the game is really worth the candle. 
This last point was a key factor for Atiyah forty years ago when he concluded that 
the industrial scheme was the superior and more up to date compensation model.136 
Although this article traces the decline of that scheme, it is argued here that lessons 
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can still be learned from the history of workmen’s compensation and how the no-fault 
system operates today. Fundamental questions are posed about how compensation 
ought to be delivered to those who really need it and at what cost. 
